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Abstract 
Global poverty and poverty reduction are right now, more prominent public issues in 
high-income countries than they have ever have been, but progress toward the eradication 
of global poverty is at increasingly grave risk due to global macro-economic imbalances.  
At the heart of the problem is the U.S. external deficit that has turned the U.S. into the 
world’s largest debtor nation while developing countries, most notably in East Asia, are 
now among the world’s largest creditors.     
The impact of the adjustment of the U.S. external deficit on developing country 
economies will depend on U.S. macro-economic policy ahead, whether growth of U.S. 
exports or a decline in U.S. imports accounts for most of the reduction of the external 
deficit, how China, and by implication the rest of East Asia, respond to what happens in 
the U.S., and on the speed with which the U.S. deficit is closed. 
A review of how the world economy came to find itself in this historically unprecedented 
situation is followed by three potential scenarios for the likely impact on developing 
country economies of a marked decline in the U.S. external deficit.   
In the first scenario, the decline of the U.S. external deficit is fairly slow and steady and 
developing countries are able to substitute domestic demand growth for external demand 
growth and adjust without a recession.  
In the second scenario, U.S. aggregate demand for imports declines more severely 
because of slower economic growth and a smaller contribution of U.S. export growth to 
the closing of the external deficit. Chinese import demand growth is adversely affected 
and developing countries face a decline both in U.S. and Chinese import demand.  
In the third and last scenario, a sudden adjustment that generates a global financial 
tsunami, most likely triggered by a run on the dollar that leads to a spike in interest rates 
in the U.S. and a sharp drop in U.S. import demand, would transmit the downturn from 
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  2Foreword 
 
Dick Sabot was a longtime friend, a co-author of mine over many years, and an active 
member of the Center’s founding Board of Directors. He was finishing this paper when 
he died suddenly on July 6 of this year.  I had visited him late in June, at his home in 
Williamstown, to discuss the outline for a new paper we were to write together, and to 
give him comments (and argue about!) this paper of his.  Though I am sure he must have 
taught macroeconomics at some point in his many years on the faculty at Williams 
College, I believe this was his first written work as an economist on U.S. macroeconomic 
policy.  He took the leap because of his conviction that current policy, particularly the 
collapse of U.S. public savings, was creating risks not only for the welfare of Americans 
but for the welfare of the world’s poor in developing countries.  On this point, as is clear 
from his text and as he told me himself, he was greatly influenced by the speech of Larry 
Summers on the public savings issue in the U.S. at the Institute of International 
Economics in the spring of 2004 (and by Summers’ Per Jacobsson lecture in the fall) and 
by the analysis of William Cline, our own senior fellow, of the causes and implications of 
the current global imbalance (Bill’s book The United States as a Debtor Nation, Center 
for Global Development and Institute of International Economics, 2005).   
 
Dick recognized full well that on the risks for the U.S. and the world economy 
there is much disagreement among economists.  But that disagreement is reflected in a 
highly technical and inaccessible form for most readers, and with the exception of Cline’s 
work, has been heavily concentrated on the question of the risks for the U.S. and its 
major trading partners.  He wanted to make the outlines of the broader debate more clear 
and accessible for more readers, and he believed the risks for the developing world 
needed much more attention.   
 
The discussion in this paper is sober, measured, and balanced as well as 
accessible.  It is mostly in the final paragraphs that Dick’s excitement and passion about 
the topic, and his inveterate optimism, get their full airing.  In his own words: 
 
The world economy is balanced on a knife edge. . . .If it falls one way . . . (then 
for) the first time in human history, the end of mass global poverty is not just a 
pipe dream but a feasible goal. However, if the world economy falls the other way 
. . . the number in poverty and all that implies for the sum of human suffering, 
will increase.  The key determinants of which way the world economy falls off 
the knife’s edge are the choices we make in the U.S.  The rest of the world, and in 
particular the world’s poor countries, have a big stake in what we choose to do.  
The U.S., as a world leader, has been tested before, and it has risen to the 
challenge.  It has the capacity to do so again.   
 
  In his closing paragraphs, Dick captured the perspective the Center tries to bring 
to the broad policy debates – that policy choices in the rich world and at the global level, 
have tremendous implications for progress against poverty in the poor world.  In 
emphasizing that point, this paper builds on and complements Cline’s new book on the 
broader challenges posed by the U.S.’s current status as the world’s largest debtor.   
I know Dick would join me in thanking heartily two staff members of the Center. 
He was particularly grateful to Bill Cline for his comments on an earlier draft, as I am to 
Bill for his help in adjusting Dick’s text in the light of Bill’s own latest results.  He 
mentioned to me several times in our several conversations in June, including during my 
last visit, what a pleasure it was working with Gunilla Pettersson, and how grateful he 
was to her for her insights, her wisdom about the value of data, and her generous help and 
energy.  I add my own thanks to those of Dick to Gunilla; we would not have been able to 
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  4A.  Introduction 
 
Global poverty and the potential for its elimination are, right now, probably more 
prominent public issues in high-income countries than they ever have been.
1 The 
recognition, post 9/11, that poverty, ignorance and hopelessness provide fertile soil for 




  Often overlooked in the discussion about poverty eradication are four key points: 
 
First, much progress has already been made toward this goal. The last decades 
have seen a marked reduction of global poverty from roughly 40 percent of the world’s 
population to roughly 20 percent. Hundreds of millions of people are no longer poor.
3 




Second, this remarkable progress has been achieved by development policies that 
create a stable economic environment, and a market-oriented set of incentives, that enable 
people in low-income countries to augment their human capital and harness their quite 
abundant entrepreneurial talents.  While foreign aid may have contributed to the growth it 
has not played a decisive role. Rather this growth has been stimulated and sustained by 
private companies in Asia taking advantage of the competitive edge in foreign markets 




                                                 
1 Some of the credit should go to the UN and to Sachs (2005) and his team, to Prime Minister Blair and  
Chancellor of the Exchequer Brown of Great Britain, who placed global poverty at the top of the agenda of 
the G-8, and to such entertainers as Bono and Bob Geldof, whose production most recently of the Live8 
concerts have heightened popular awareness of global poverty and the potential for eliminating it. 
2 CGD (2004). 
3 In Asia, where a 1 percent increase in household income is associated with a 2 percent decline in poverty, 
the number of poor dropped from roughly 920 million to around 690 million just over the period 1990 to 
2002. Kuroda (2005). 
4 The economies of East Asia have consistently and dramatically out-performed the economies of Latin 
America and Africa as well as the high-income economies of Europe and North America and the oil-rich 
economies of the Middle East. The per capita incomes of these high performing economies have more than 
doubled every decade. And, because the benefits of growth have been relatively widespread within these 
countries, the opportunity for people to work their way out of poverty has been large. This phenomenon of 
rapid sustained growth began in Japan which was then emulated in the late 1960s by the Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The economies of Southeast Asia – Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand 
then followed. China’s growth began to accelerate some 25 years ago – its GDP in 2004 was 10 times what 
it was in 1979 – and India joined the rapid growth club much more recently. See World Bank (1993) and 
Birdsall and Sabot (forthcoming). 
5 Exports grew rapidly in the seven economies of East and Southeast Asia, excluding China:  in 1965, they 
produced 3 percent of the world's exports, a figure that more than quadrupled to nearly 13 percent by 2003.  
Add China and India to this group and the share of the world’s exports of the Asian economies rose from 5 
percent to 19 percent (WDI, 2005). Since 1979, China’s external trade grew by an average of 16.7 percent a 
year. Kuroda (2005). Third, if China, other East Asian nations and India continue to grow rapidly, and 
other developing countries follow their example then this remarkable progress toward the 
elimination of global poverty can be sustained. The opportunity is there for economies in 
Africa and Latin America to emulate the performance of the Asian economies.
6 For 
example, the elimination of protection in high income countries against the products of 
low income countries, in particular agricultural goods and textiles and apparel would 
yield annual gains to low income countries that Cline (2004) estimates to be $100 billion 
annually.
7 Roughly three-quarters of the world’s poor are located in rural areas and they 
would benefit from the higher prices they would receive for their agricultural products. 
Cline estimates that the reduction of agricultural protection in high-income countries 
would lift another roughly 200 million people out of poverty globally.
8  
 
Fourth, this progress toward the eradication of global poverty is at increasingly 
grave risk. Governments are not good at creating wealth. However, for private sectors to 
succeed at building wealth they must have a foundation, a crucial component of which is 
macro-economic stability, on which to build. The responsibility for laying this foundation 
is that of governments. If governments fail to do this not only can they inhibit growth but 
they can, quickly and perniciously, wipe out wealth. Currently the world economy is 
seriously out of macro-economic balance. If governments mismanage the necessary 
adjustment to the current imbalance then the progress in improving human welfare at the 
bottom of the pyramid might not only slow, it will be eroded 
 
Both economic theory and history suggest that high-income countries should be 
net exporters of capital. To increase their rates of investment, and their rates of growth, 
low-income countries are more likely to supplement domestic savings by importing 
capital. Currently, global capital flows are running directly contrary to expectations: the 
U.S., clearly a very rich nation, has been borrowing heavily for the past two decades to 
finance its trade deficits and is now, by far, the world’s largest debtor nation; developing 
countries, most notably in East Asia, have been exporting capital and now are among the 
world’s largest creditors. 
 
How long can this global macro-economic imbalance be sustained? Economists 
disagree. How will balance be reestablished? Will it happen slowly, in a relatively benign 
way, or will there be a sudden discontinuity that could generate a global financial tsunami 
that slams the financial markets and economies of both high and low-income nations? 
Again, economists disagree. 
 
 About one aspect of this situation there is little disagreement among economists, 
namely the inevitability of a reduction in the dependence of the U.S. on foreign capital. 
                                                 
6 This is not to imply that the problem of poverty is now confined to Africa and Latin America. In terms of 
absolute numbers of poor people, the poverty problem in Asia remains larger than the problem in Africa or 
Latin America. Kuroda (2005). 
7 Cline (2004). This gain is about twice the magnitude of annual development assistance provided by high 
income countries to low income countries. 
8 Cline (2004).  Moreover, this reduction in protection would benefit consumers in high income countries 
who are currently paying higher prices for agricultural goods than they would be if the import taxes on 
those products were reduced or eliminated. 
  6Precisely when and how, we do not know, but we do know that it will happen. Much 
attention has been paid to the implications of the reestablishment of balance, for the U.S., 
for Europe, for Japan and for China. Little attention has been paid to the implications, 
potentially profound, for the rest of the developing world.  
 
  I briefly review how the world economy came to find itself in this unorthodox and 
historically unprecedented situation, and then focus on the likely consequences for 
developing countries, both creditors and debtors, of a marked decline in the trade deficit 
of the U.S.   
 
What will the costs be to the developing world if the U.S. deficit closes smoothly 
and slowly? What benefits might they derive from this adjustment? What will be the 
costs if the deficit closes quickly, as a result of a discontinuity? What are the 
determinants of whether the adjustment process is smooth or results in a financial 
tsunami? Just how much systemic risk are we facing? Is it declining or increasing? What 
U.S. policies would reduce the systemic risk and hence be simultaneously in the interest 
of the U. S. and “development friendly”? Which policies might developing countries 
adopt to minimize the costs and maximize the benefits of what promises to be a major 
shift in global trade and financial flows and macro-economic relationships? 
 
 
B.  The Problem and Its Causes: The U.S. Should Not Blame Others 
 
High-income countries are characterized by an abundance of capital and a scarcity 
of labor; in low-income countries capital is scare and labor is abundant. Returns to labor 
should therefore be higher in high than in low-income countries and returns to capital 
should be higher in low than in high-income countries. Since labor and capital both seek 
high returns, labor should flow from low to high-income countries and capital should 
flow from high to low-income countries.
9
  
In high-income countries the returns to labor are, indeed, a multiple of what they 
are in low-income countries. The average American worker earns much more in an hour 
than the average Chinese worker earns in a day. Yes, there are political and institutional 
constraints on the mobility of labor. Nevertheless, the Mexico-U.S. border confirms to 
even the casual observer that people want to move to where they are more richly 
rewarded for their work.  
 
Capital flows are less constrained. Over the last century the tendency has been for 
financial capital to flow to where expected returns on capital are highest, from high to 
low-income countries. Historically, the U.S. certainly fit that pattern. In the 18
th and 19
th 
centuries, when the U.S. was still a relatively low-income, capital scarce country, capital, 
seeking higher returns, flowed in from Europe. The American railroads, for example, 
were largely built with foreign money. Once the U.S. had been transformed into a high-
income country, the U.S. became a net exporter of capital. American investors, seeking 
                                                 
9 Phase model. 
  7higher returns than they believed they could get at home, put money to work around the 
globe.  
 
Since 1980, however, the U.S. has broken the pattern. For nearly every year over 
the past 25 years the U.S. has, in effect, been borrowing from the rest of the world. The 
cumulative impact of that borrowing has been to turn the U.S., the world’s richest nation, 
from the world’s largest creditor into the world’s largest debtor. U.S. foreign debt, net, is 
now over $3 trillion, or roughly 30 percent of GNP. In 2004 the U.S. added more than 
$600bn net, roughly 5.5 percent of GNP, to its total borrowings from overseas, increasing 
aggregate foreign debt by 25 percent. Gross, the U.S. now has to borrow at the rate of $5 
billion every working day.
10 The large size of the U.S. economy – over 20 percent of 
global GNP – amplifies the impact on global capital markets of the substantial borrowing 
requirements of the U.S.: the borrowing required to finance the U.S. current account 
deficit absorbs roughly two thirds of the aggregate current account surplus of all the 
world’s surplus countries.
11 Much of that borrowing is from relatively poor countries.
12
 
What explains the transformation of the U.S. from the world’s biggest external 
creditor to its biggest debtor?   
 
First, the U.S. trade deficit is, in part, simply a reflection of the greater economic 
dynamism here than abroad. The U. S. imports 16 percent of GDP and exports 11 percent 
of GDP. So, even if economic growth is the same elsewhere than as in the U. S., the trade 
deficit will worsen.
13 The slower growth of our key trading partners than of the U.S. 
implies that U.S. imports will grow still more rapidly than U.S. exports, further 
increasing the trade deficit.  While attention has focused on the American trade deficit 
with China and on China’s extremely rapid growth, the reality is that the volume of U.S. 
trade with the slow-growing G-6 countries – Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Britain and 
Canada – is four times as large as the trade with China and India combined.
14
 
Faster growth of the G-6 would undoubtedly increase American exports.
15 
Commenting on the announcement that the American trade deficit set a new record in 
February, with an annual run rate of over $700 billion, Secretary of the Treasury Snow 
pointed to the sluggishness of our biggest trading partners and urged them to overcome 
their structural impediments to more rapid growth.
16 But, given what a small increment to 
                                                 
10 Bergsten (2005). 
11 BIS (2005), p. 90.  As Roubini and Setser (2005a), p. 8 put it, the U.S. trade deficit “is large absolutely, 
large relative to U.S. GDP, large relative to the United States’ small export base and large relative to the 
world’s current account surplus.” 
12 The current account surplus of China which, despite its rapid growth, is still a poor country will be over 
$100 billion in 2005, about 6 percent of its GDP and is growing very rapidly. Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Malaysia are also relatively low-income countries with large surpluses. Bergsten (2005). 
13 Conversely, the exports of the U.S. have to grow roughly 50 percent faster than imports to keep the trade 
deficit at the same level. 
14 Gross, NYT, 04/17/05. 
15 For the authors of the Economic Report of the President, 2004 this is the key determinant of the growth 
of the trade deficit: “The rapid growth of imports relative to exports largely reflects faster growth in the 
U.S. than among our trading partners….” CEA (2005), p. 37.  
16 Becker, NYT, 02/11/05. 
  8the demand for American exports results from an increase in the output and incomes of 
our biggest trading partners,
17 even if they reduced their labor market rigidities, high 
taxes and constraints on innovation, and bettered the U.S. growth rate by 25-30 percent, 
the increase in imports from the U.S. would not be sufficiently large to make a big dent in 
the U.S. trade deficit.
18  
 
There is a less desirable link, one that Secretary Snow did not mention, between 
the growth of our trading partners and the U.S. trade deficit. Slow growth in Europe and 
Japan helps explain why, despite rapid growth in the U.S., India, China and elsewhere in 
East Asia, medium and long term interest rates, and the rate of inflation, have remained 
so low. If investment and growth were to accelerate in our largest trading partners, so 
would interest rates and the rate of increase of the prices of commodities, such as oil, and 
finished products. The growth of the U.S. would slow, perhaps markedly, as would the 
growth of American imports. In seeking the solution to the American trade deficit in the 
growth of our trading partners, Secretary Snow should take note of the cliché, “be careful 
of what you wish for.” 
 
The second determinant of the U.S. shift from creditor to debtor is also associated 
with the most optimistic view of American reliance on foreign capital. The culture of 
innovation in the U.S. distinguishes its economy from virtually all others. The U.S. is 
incomparable both with regard to its technological prowess and to the pace at which 
teams of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists convert technical advances into new 
products and businesses. The pace of innovation could be offsetting diminishing returns 
to the accumulation of capital. The result: the returns to capital may be higher here than 
in many low-income countries where capital is in relatively much scarcer supply. 
 
The 1990s provided support for this hypothesis. This was a time of extraordinary 
technological innovation, an investment boom and a closely related surge in the value of 
technology stocks. Foreigners wanted to invest here to take advantage of the perceived 
high returns and so large flows of foreign private capital flooded U.S. financial markets 
further driving up the value of equities and of the dollar. The exceptionally strong dollar 
reduced the competitiveness of our exports and made imports a bargain.  During the 
1990s it appeared as though the American trade deficit, and the capital inflows needed to 
fund it, were signs of American innovation and economic strength. And if, indeed, the 
returns to capital are higher in the U.S. than elsewhere there should be no problem 
servicing the foreign debt and sustaining these foreign capital inflows.  
 
Unfortunately, when the stock market tech bubble popped in 2000, what 
happened contradicted the optimistic view of chronic American trade deficits. The steep 
drop in the value of American equities led foreigners to re-evaluate where the returns on 
                                                 
17 See Summers (2004). Mussa (2005), p. 1, asserts “[f]or the United States, estimates of the marginal 
propensity to spend on imports are in the range of one-fifth to no more than one-third…. For the [rest of the 
world], the marginal propensity to spend on U.S. goods and services is no more than one-tenth.” 
18 In fact, contrary to the view that faster growth of our leading trading partners is necessary to reduce the 
U.S. current account deficit, the last time the U.S. needed to close a large external deficit, during the late 
1980s, the reduction in the current account deficit was associated with a slowdown of growth in the G-6 
from 5.3 percent in 1988 to 2.2 percent in 1991. See Cline (forthcoming). 
  9capital are highest. Private foreign capital inflows reached a maximum of roughly $1 
trillion in 2000. “They exceeded private U.S. outflows by about $450 billion or more than 
enough to cover the current account deficit of about $415 billion.”
19  
 
While the current account deficit continued to balloon, from $400 billion in 2000 
to $600 billion in 2004, private capital inflows declined by half, from $1 trillion to $500 
billion. U.S. private capital outflows also fell somewhat. Nevertheless, from funding 
nearly all of the U.S. deficit in 2000, net private capital inflows were only sufficient to 
fund only a little more than a third of the U.S. current account deficit in 2004. At the end 
of this four-year period of recession and recovery, the tech heavy NASDAQ index was 
not even half of what it was at the beginning. The expectations of foreign investors 
regarding the returns to capital in the U.S. had been diminished. There is little to suggest 
in this story that the foreign appetite for U.S. assets, whetted by America’s unique 
technological prowess and capacity to innovate, was the key causal factor driving the 
American trade deficit. 
 
 If private capital inflows were declining sharply as a share of the deficit, then 
how was the U.S. current account deficit being financed? While the dollar fell in value 
relative to a trade-weighted basket of currencies during the 2000-2004 period, another 
question raised by the decline in the share of the current account deficit funded by foreign 
private capital inflow is “why didn’t the dollar plummet?” Who was buying the ever 
more abundant dollars made available on foreign exchange markets by the growing gap 
between American imports and American exports?  
 
Figure 1 provides the explanation. They were being bought by the central banks 
of Asian countries, predominantly by the central banks of China and Japan. Their 
purchases of dollars increased ten-fold over this period, from roughly $40 billion in 2000 
to a historically unprecedented $400 billion in 2004.
20 These bankers financed roughly 
two-thirds of the massive American current account deficit in 2004. They converted most 
of their holdings of dollars into U.S. Treasury securities. By September 2004 foreign 




If foreign private investors were no longer convinced that returns on capital were 
higher in the U.S. than elsewhere, why did a handful of Asian central bankers step in and 
make the purchases of American financial assets that private foreign investors no longer 
wanted to own? We will answer this question below. First it is necessary to understand 
why, during the late 1990s the simultaneous decrease in the budget deficit and increase in 
the trade deficit did not, in fact, imply that the two deficits are not closely connected. And 
understanding this will also bring us to a 3
rd, and fundamental, determinant of chronic 
                                                 
19 Cline (forthcoming). 
20 Roubini and Setser (2005a), p. 12, claim that official U.S. data actually understates dependence on 
foreign central bank financing and that the data provided by the Bank for International Settlements is more 
accurate. Their data indicate central banks provided the US roughly $485 billion of reserve financing in 
2003 and roughly $465 billion in 2004, for a total of nearly $1 trillion over two years. 
21 Cline (forthcoming). 
  10American dependence on foreign capital: low rates of private and public savings in the 
U.S. 
 
During the late 1990s the budget deficit declined sharply. Tax rates had been 
raised and the stock market boom was generating extraordinary tax revenue on capital 
gains. Indeed the federal budget actually shifted from deficits to large surpluses. And yet 
the trade deficit, and foreign capital inflows, continued to increase. At least to some 
analysts,
22 this was strong evidence that federal budget deficits are not directly linked to 
trade deficits and capital inflows. The question these skeptical analysts ask is: if the fiscal 
and trade accounts are “twin deficits” why didn’t a marked decline in the former result in 
a decline, rather than an increase, in the latter? 
 
  The simple answer is that there are more than two variables involved in the 
relationship. To understand how the trade and budget deficits move in relation to each 
other it is also necessary to know what is happening to investment and private savings. 
To the extent that domestic investment exceeds domestic savings, both public (as 
measured by the federal budget deficit) and private, there is a domestic resource gap that 
can only be filled by drawing on savings from other countries. The foreign savings inflow 
is identical to the excess of imports over exports.  
 
  The explanation for why, from 1992 to 2000, the current account went from near 
balance, -0.5 percent of GDP, to large deficit, -3.9 percent of GDP, while the federal 
budget moved from a deficit of –2.4 percent of GDP to a surplus of 4.4 percent of GDP, 
representing a massive 6.8 percentage point increase in public savings, is to be found in 
what happened to investment in the U.S. and to private savings.  See Table 1.
23
  
  There was a boom in investment and a decline in private savings and the two 
trends were probably linked. Over this eight year period, which coincided with the birth 
and expansion of companies associated with the Internet, net private investment increased 
by 3.5 percentage points, from 4.1 to 7.6 percent of GDP. The sharp increases in the 
value of equity portfolios, which made households feel wealthier, may have contributed 
to the –4.1 percentage point decline in household savings. So despite the big increase in 
public savings, as the federal budget moved from deficit to surplus, the domestic resource 
gap actually increased. More foreign savings were required to fund the addition to 
investment and to substitute for the decline in private savings, and so the current account 
deficit rose.  
 
Had the fiscal situation not improved as much as it did over this period, while 
private savings and investment remained as observed, the domestic resource gap and the 
                                                 
22 CATO Institute.  For example see Reynolds (2004). 
23 Cline (forthcoming) observes that this negative correlation between the two deficits is the rule rather than 
the exception. Over the past 20 years the two deficits move in the same direction only 30 percent of the 
time. See also Truman (2004). 
  11current account deficit at the end of the period would have been larger than it actually 
was. There is no escaping the link between the budget and current account deficits.
24
 
What happened during the 2000-2004 period only reinforces this point. The 
Federal Budget moved back from a surplus of 2.4 percent of GDP, into deficit, -3.6 
percent of GDP. The deterioration in the fiscal accounts during the first term of President 
Bush, -6 percentage points, was nearly as great as the 6.8 percentage point improvement 
during the Clinton administration, but it happened in only half the time. And only 0.9 
percent of GDP of that deterioration could be accounted for by the recession that 
followed the boom of 1999-2000.
25 The rest was due to policy choices, increases in 
public spending and reductions in taxes.  
 
The impact of the marked fiscal deterioration on the resource gap was only partly 
offset by a 1.1 percentage point drop in investment and 1.3 percentage point increase in 
private savings. Net, the resource gap increased by 3.2 percentage points. As a result, 
between 2000 and 2004 the current account deficit rose to roughly 6 percent of GDP.  
 
This was one of the few occasions over the last 20 years that an increase in the 
budget deficit translated directly into an increase in the trade deficit. It is clear that the 
decline in public sector savings has played an important role in the increase in the U.S. 
current account deficit.  Since investment in the U.S. actually declined during this period, 
the implication is that the increased foreign capital inflows were being used to finance 
public consumption. If foreign capital is not financing high return investments then that 
raises questions both about the ability of the U.S. to service the debt and about the 
sustainability of the foreign capital inflows.  
 
The fact that, at the margin, foreign capital inflows have, over the past four years, 
been financing public consumption rather than private investment also helps explain the 
decline in the flow of private capital into the U.S. and the increase in the purchase of 
dollars by foreign, read Asian, central banks. Private capital simply flows to where the 
risk-adjusted returns are highest. Central bankers have motives other than return 
maximization for acquiring American assets.  
 
In particular, over the past four years central bankers in China and Japan acquired 
hundreds of billions of dollars as a means of putting a ceiling on the value of their 
currencies relative to the dollar. The conventional wisdom is that by keeping the renminbi 
from rising, the prices of Chinese exports in the U.S. remain competitive.
26 China has 
                                                 
24 The assertion by Levey and Brown (2005a) that there is only a tenuous link between the budget deficit 
and the current account deficit is not correct. The link is a powerful one. However, it is not a simple one. It 
is necessary to take account of a few other variables to understand it.  
25 Cline (forthcoming). 
26 While the euro has increased in value relative to the dollar by some 55 percent since the dollar’s peak in 
March of 2002, the value of the renminbi has not changed at all relative to the dollar. In fact, on a trade-
weighted basis, it depreciated by 11 percent because of the dollar’s decline. The yen rose by some 30 
percent against the dollar over the same period, substantially less than it would have risen had the Japanese 
central bank not been buying dollars. And the yen rose much less on a trade-weighted basis. See Cline 
(forthcoming). 
  12been experiencing sustained rapid export-led growth that is enriching millions of its 
citizens, pulling tens of millions more out of poverty and transforming the country into a 
great economic power. Chinese leaders do not want this growth to be interrupted. Other 
central banks, in Asia and elsewhere, followed the Chinese and Japanese lead so as to 




Central bank intervention in currency markets is seen, particularly by the Bush 
administration, as a 4
th important determinant of the U.S. current account deficit. There is 
no doubt that if the Chinese and Japanese, and other, central bankers had not intervened, 
the dollar would have fallen against the yen, the renminbi and other Asian currencies and 
that, as a consequence, the American trade deficit would have been smaller. But this is 
where the conventional wisdom may not have it right. And where American policy 
makers pressuring the Chinese to allow their currency to float, and rise to the level 
determined by the market, might, if they had their way, be in for a rude shock.  
 
The facts are that many Chinese goods are so much less expensive than U.S. 
manufactured substitutes and that many other Chinese goods no longer have close U.S. 
manufactured substitutes that even sharp increases in the prices of Chinese manufactured 
exports may have very little impact on the demand for them. If so, the increase in their 




Why then assert that a sharp rise of the renminbi would result in a reduction of the 
U.S. current account deficit? Because if the Chinese and other central banks markedly 
reduce their purchases of American dollars the U.S. domestic resource gap will not be 
adequately funded. And it will have to narrow.
29 Exactly how that would happen cannot 
be forecast with precision but, as one example, a marked decline in the purchase of 
dollars by central banks would also mean a sharp decline in the purchase of U.S. 
Treasury securities. Interest rates would rise, potentially triggering a recession in the U.S. 
A decline in U.S. incomes would lead to a decline in investment, hence in the domestic 
resource gap. This is one potential route to the hard landing, the discontinuity, the global 
financial tsunami that so many analysts fear. 
 
The Asian central bank intervention in currency markets may be sustaining their 
export-led growth not so much by keeping their exports price competitive but by 
                                                 
27 Hong Kong and Malaysia also fixed their currencies relative to the dollar while the currencies of 
Thailand, Singapore and Taiwan increased by only about 10 percent and actually depreciated on a trade-
weighted basis. Cline (forthcoming). 
28 Because the demand for oil is so insensitive to the price of oil – price inelastic – this is precisely what 
happens when the price of oil rises. 
29 The abundance of savings in East Asia, together with the willingness by central bankers in the region to 
make savings available to the U.S. may be a necessary condition for sustaining the U.S. current account 
deficit but it is not a sufficient condition, as Bernanke (2005) and Wolf, FT, 06/13/05, suggest. If the US 
resource gap was smaller, so would be the current account deficit, irrespective of the willingness of the 
Asian central banks to buy dollars. The availability of savings in East Asia did not lead to current account 
deficits in Europe. 
  13allowing Americans to continue to live beyond their means.
30 If Chinese central bankers 
succumbed to the pressure of American, and other foreign, economic policy makers the 
result would, most likely, be a reduction of the American trade deficit but by a 
mechanism far more painful than the one envisaged. Again the cliché, “be careful of what 
you ask for” appears to be relevant.
31
 
This leads to a more general point about the current account deficit and the value 
of the dollar. The dollar has declined in value substantially over the past two years. But 
the American trade deficit continues to grow and to set new records. This may be due, in 
part, to lags, as purchasers take time to find lower priced alternatives. It may also reflect a 
more fundamental reality: declines in the value of the dollar, while necessary to achieve 
global macro-economic balance, are not sufficient.
32 Without a reduction in the U.S. 
domestic resource gap, which means either an increase in U.S. savings or a decrease in 
investment, a change in the relative prices of domestic and foreign goods will not have 
much impact on the U.S. current account deficit. A revaluation of the renminbi must be a 
part of the process of reestablishing global macro-economic balance but it is far better for 
it to be done in conjunction with policy changes in the U.S. that increases savings. 
 
 
C.  The Argument So Far 
 
The conclusions we reach from our brief assessment of why, contrary to what 
theory and history would lead us to expect, the capital abundant U.S. has become the 
world’s largest external debtor, while a group of capital scarce low income countries have 
become major external creditors are, we think, clear: 
 
1)  The slow growth of the biggest trading partners of the U.S. is a factor 
explaining the American trade deficit, but not a big one. 
 
2)  While there was a brief period, during the 1990s, when growth of the U.S. 
trade deficit could be explained by the inflow of foreign private capital in 
                                                 
30 East Asian economies also built up reserves following the financial crisis of 1997-98 as security against 
another crisis.  But the buildup is way in excess of what a crisis might require. The ratio of reserves to 
imports in these countries has surged. It is likely that the goal of the continued buildup of reserves is to 
sustain export led growth. See Cline (forthcoming). 
31 There is another possible geopolitical explanation for the sustained purchase of dollars by Asian central 
banks. They are a means of ensuring that the U.S. does what, China and Japan agree, is necessary militarily 
to keep Middle East oil flowing onto the world market and fuelling their industrial growth. Asian central 
bank loans to the U.S. government are, indirectly, helping to fund the U.S. military budget. If there is 
substance to this explanation then it follows that President Bush I struck a much better deal arranging for 
foreign financing of the 1990 Persian Gulf war than did President Bush II of the current Persian Gulf war. 
President Bush I persuaded foreign governments to provide grants to fund the first war while, implicitly, 
the best President Bush II could do, was arrange for foreign loans. 
32 Without a reduction in the domestic resource gap, a decline in the dollar is likely to have negative 
feedback effects that would diminish the impact of the decline of the currency on the trade deficit. The 
stimulus to aggregate demand, hence to imports, that a currency decline would induce, is one such feedback 
effect. 
  14response to high investment and high expected returns to capital in the U.S. 
that certainly has not been the case over the past four years. 
 
3)  Since 2000, the share of the U.S. external deficit financed by private foreign 
capital has declined sharply while the share financed by the purchase of 
dollars by Asian central banks has surged. 
 
4)  While Asian central bank intervention has contributed to the U.S. external 
deficit by keeping Asian currencies at artificially low levels, the contribution 
is not large, and stopping that intervention is as likely to trigger a downturn in 
the U.S. as it is to close the U.S. trade gap by changing the relative prices of 
imports and exports. 
 
5)  More generally, a decline in the dollar, no matter how marked, will not, by 
itself eliminate the U.S. trade deficit. The domestic resource gap must also be 
reduced. 
 
6)  The low rate of savings in the U.S. is the most important factor contributing to 
the domestic resource gap, hence the U.S. external deficit. The U.S. is 
becoming increasingly dependent on foreign savings to fund its investment, 
and more worrying, to finance government consumption. 
 
7)  Low household savings rates are a chronic problem in the U.S., the origins of 
which are only poorly understood.  
 
8)  There was a sharp decline in U.S. public sector saving over the past four 
years, as government expenditures rose and tax revenues fell as a percentage 
of GDP and this decline was largely responsible for the growth of the U.S. 
external deficit over this period. 
 
9)  The current U.S. administration shifts between denying that the growing 
foreign indebtedness of the U.S. is a problem, and asserting that the cause of 
the problem is to be found in other countries. Our conclusion is that the 
problem is big and it is growing. Other countries will have to help us find a 




D.  Reestablishing Global Macro-Economic Balance: Alternative Paths  
 
We noted that there is little disagreement among economists about the 
inevitability of a decline in the dependence of the U.S. on foreign capital. Little, of 
course, does not mean none. Some sophisticated analysts believe that those who voice 
their concern about this growing dependence are Cassandras.
33 It appears as though they 
believe that “everything is for the best in this best of all possible worlds”.  Jeremy Siegel, 
                                                 
33 See Levey and Brown (2005a). 
  15a leading academic expert on U.S. equity markets has committed to just such a Candidean 
perspective. He predicts that the current global macro-economic imbalance will be 
sustained for decades. And in a way that is not destabilizing but actually allows the global 
economy to continue to prosper and grow. It is the transformation of the poor countries of 
the world, whose populations are much younger than the currently rich countries, into 
newly rich countries that will enable this to happen. We quote: 
 
“…I posed the fundamental question facing the developed world over the next 
half century: who will produce the goods that the retirees need, and who will buy 
the assets that they sell during their retirement? We have found the answer: … 
workers and investors from developing countries. The aging populations (of high 
income countries) will import the goods and services they need, and finance these 




These coming patterns of world commerce will cause increasing trade 
deficits in both the United States and the rest of the developed world. But these 
deficits are not necessarily a cause for concern…. They will arise as part of the 
inevitable demographic trends that dictate the exchange of goods for assets that 
are part of the global solution. 
 
As most of the world’s output will be produced by the developing nations, 
eventually most of the assets in the United States, Europe, and Japan will be 
owned by investors in the developing world. By the middle of this century, I 
believe the Chinese, Indians, and other investors from these young (sic.) countries 
will gain majority ownership in most of the large global corporations.”
35
 
This is a grand and intriguing vision and, who knows, it may come to be realized. 
There are, however, some obvious questions raised by this means of sustaining American 
trade deficits for decades. Will the American people agree to allow the sale of a trillion or 
more dollars a year in assets to the newly rich of China, India and other developing 
nations?  Are they prepared to cede the economic, diplomatic, even military, power that 
such a transfer of assets would inevitably entail? Will they place political obstacles in the 
way of the transfer of the wealth of the U.S. to the formerly poor countries of the 
world?
36
                                                 
34 Implicit in this forecast is the suggestion of another determinant of why the U.S. has shifted from being a 
creditor to being a debtor and why low-income countries in Asia have emerged as external creditors: the 
difference between them in demographic profiles. 
35  Siegel (2005), pp. 218-19. In addition to the impediments to the fulfillment of this vision mentioned 
below, because of the aggressive implementation of “the one child policy” in China and rapidly increasing 
life expectancy, the population there is aging much more rapidly than in other developing countries. 
36 As the New York Times, 06/26/05 said in an editorial triggered by the $18.5 billion all-cash takeover bid 
by the state-controlled China National Offshore Oil Corporation for the American oil company Unocal, 
“with China on a buying binge for raw materials to feed its ever-expanding economy, it was inevitable that 
it would eventually … make a grab for something the United states really cares about…. And it raises the 
interesting question of whether the CNOOC can have it both ways: playing by Chinese rules at home while 
taking advantage of American rules abroad to buy an American business. After all, this is a government-
owned company operating in an authoritarian state that limits the ability of foreign companies to take their 
  16There is a more immediate practical issue that casts doubt on the realization of 
this vision. As we have already seen, the huge purchases of dollars by Asians are not 
being made by the newly rich in that part of the world but, to a large extent, by Asian 
central banks. Constraints on capital outflows are one reason for this.  But even in 
countries where capital is free to leave the newly rich are not choosing to invest in the 
U.S. in any substantial way.  
 
This may be due to the fact that at the margin foreign capital inflows are now 
funding government consumption rather than investment in the U.S. Hence the expected 
returns on that capital cannot be high. At the same time returns to investment in the 
newly emerging industrial countries have been quite high. Siegel (2005) provides some 
counter-examples: the acquisition of IBM’s personal computer division by Lenovo of 
China; the acquisition of LTV Corp. and Bethlehem Steel by an Indian steel 
manufacturer.  The pace of such acquisition would have to greatly increase to enable the 
U.S. dependence on foreign capital to be sustained. In the meantime the central banks are 
carrying the burden.
37 And the key question is whether that burden is becoming too heavy 
to continue to bear? 
 
Let’s not dismiss the Siegel vision but rather consider it a potentially appealing 
long shot and say that its chances of being realized are 1 in 20 or even, more 
optimistically, 1 in 10. That still leaves us to assess what happens in the much more likely 
case that foreign private capital flows are not sufficient to sustain the American trade 
deficit? Will Asian central banks, which have acquired roughly a trillion dollars over the 
past four years going to be willing to acquire many trillions more dollars? That they 
would be is difficult to conceive.
38 If they are not then the U.S. will have to wean itself 
from dependence on foreign capital inflows. This means that the chronic U.S. trade 
deficits will have to be substantially reduced. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
profits out of China…. The CNOOC bid… deserves examination above and beyond the regulatory scrutiny 
normally given to corporate mergers and acquisitions.”  
37 Levey and Brown (2005a) predict that “official Asian capital inflows should soon be supplemented by a 
renewal of private inflows”. Krugman, NYT, 06/27/05 agrees: “there’s nothing shocking per se about the 
fact that Chinese buyers are now seeking control over some American companies…. Power usually ends up 
in the hands of those who hold the purse strings. America…has been living for years on borrowed funds, 
and lately China has been buying our I.O.U.s…. But bonds yield neither a high rate of return nor control 
over how the money is spent…. At this point China’s reserves of dollars are so large that a speculative 
attack on the dollar looks far more likely than a speculative attack on the yuan. So it was predictable that, 
sooner or later, the Chinese would stop buying so many dollar bonds. Either they would stop buying 
American I.O.U.s altogether, causing a plunge in the dollar, or they would stop being satisfied with the role 
of passive financiers, and demand the power that comes with ownership. And we should be relieved that at 
least for now the Chinese aren’t dumping their dollars; they’re using them to buy American companies.” 
Note, to have foreign purchases of American corporate assets fully fund the American trade deficit would 
require more than 40 Unocal size transactions every year. This is more than a bit hard to imagine. 
38 While central banks have goals other than maximizing returns on their investments those returns are not 
irrelevant to their behavior. The more dollar denominated securities they own the greater the potential loss 
when the inevitable revaluation of their currency does occur. And the interest they are earning on the loans 
they are making to the U.S. is lower than the returns they could be making. And accumulating dollars can 
also lead to increases in the domestic money supply, hence to inflationary pressures.  
  17How will that happen? And what are the implications for developing countries? 
The answers depend on: 
 
1)  U.S. macro-economic policy in the years ahead; 
2)  Whether the growth of U.S. exports or the decline of U.S. imports accounts 
for most of the reduction of the external deficit; 
3)  How China, and by implication the rest of East Asia, respond to what happens 
in the U.S.;  
4)  On the speed with which the U.S. external deficit is closed. 
 
Since the mid-1990s the economy of the U.S. has been more dynamic than those 
of other high income countries and, therefore, has been, by far, the largest contributor 
among that group to the growth of global aggregate demand and of the global demand for 
exports. Between 1992 and 2002 the share of the U.S. economy in world GDP increased 
from 26.2 percent to 29.9 percent.
39  U.S. imports more than doubled over the decade. 
They totaled $669 billion in 1992 and $1,433 billion in 2002. The $764 billion increase in 
U.S. imports annually represented a substantial stimulus to the demand for goods and 
services produced in the rest of the world.
40  
 
The current account deficit was $48 billion in 1992 and roughly $542 billion in 
2002, a more than ten-fold increase. If in 2002 imports were only as large as exports then 
imports would have been more than a third less than they actually were. In other words, 
the growth of the current account deficit has accounted for a substantial portion of the 
U.S. stimulus to the growth of global demand. In 2002 the U.S. current account deficit 
accounted for roughly 2 percent of rest-of-world GDP.  
 
But, as Cline (forthcoming) points out, the growth of the U.S. current account 
deficit had a much bigger impact on demand in low than in high income countries: Over 
the decade 1992-2002 the trade surplus of high income countries with the U.S. rose from 
about 0.3 percent of their GDP to 0.8 percent. Over the same period, the trade surplus of 
low income countries with the U.S. increased from 1 percent of their GDP to 4.7 
percent.
41 The impact of the growing trade deficit of the U.S. on demand in low income 
countries was more than 9 times its impact in high income countries. And for some 
developing countries the increase in demand from a growing trade surplus with the U.S. 
was larger still. The increase in Mexico’s trade surplus with the U.S. over the decade to 
2003 was equivalent to an increase of 8 percent of aggregate demand. Likewise, China’s 




  It is clear that a narrowing of the U.S. trade deficit will reverse this process. 
Rather than providing a demand stimulus to the rest of the world, the U.S. will, other 
things equal, be reducing what has been an important component of rest-of-the-world 
                                                 
39 Cline (forthcoming). 
40 See Table 2. 
41 Cline (forthcoming). 
42 Cline (forthcoming). 
  18aggregate demand. And while it is not possible to forecast how that reduction of demand 
will be allocated among regions or countries, it is likely that the effect of the reduction 
will be much greater in low than in high income countries and that there will be some 
developing countries that will be hard hit.  
 
Moreover, everything else will not remain equal. In particular, whether U.S. 
demand for imports, in the aggregate, continues to grow, or declines, as the U.S. trade 
deficit narrows, will have an important influence on how big an adjustment low income 
countries will have to make to the reduction in demand stimulus from the U.S. At one 
extreme, the U.S. demand for imports, in the aggregate, continues to grow, implying that 
U.S. export growth accelerates relative to import growth and accounts for all of the 
closing of the U.S. external deficit. At the other extreme, the closing of the external 
deficit is largely accounted for by a decline in imports. Needless to say, the latter 
alternative will pose a much greater challenge for developing countries than the former. 
 
What happens to China’s economy as the U.S. closes its external deficit will also 
have a big influence on the nature and magnitude of the adjustment that other developing 
countries will have to make. China has been the second engine of growth powering the 
world economy. China’s rapid growth combined with a steady rise of imports (and 
exports) as a percentage of GDP has resulted in rapid growth of demand for the products 
and services of other countries. For example during the period 1999-2003 Chinese GDP 
increased by 42 percent and imports as a share of GDP increased from 19 to 32 percent. 
The result: Chinese imports increased from 190 billion dollars in 1999 to about $450 
billion in 2003, a 136 percent increase.
43 Thus, by 2003 China was adding roughly $260 
billion in export income to rest of the world compared to its purchases in 1999.
44  
 
At one extreme, China’s economy and its demand for imports continue to grow as 
the U.S. external deficit narrows. At the other extreme, the closing of the external deficit 
of the U.S. triggers an economic downturn in China which results in a decline in how 
much China imports. Again, the latter alternative will pose a much greater challenge for 
developing countries than the former. Clearly, if the imports of both the U.S. and China 
continue to grow during the period in which the U.S. is closing its external deficit, other 
developing countries will find it much easier to adjust than if the imports of both the U.S. 
and China are declining. 
  
The speed with which the U.S. closes its external deficit will also influence how 
challenging it will be for developing countries to adjust. If the slowing of the growth, or 
the absolute decline, in American demand for the exports of developing countries is 
spread over a number of years the impact in any given year will be smaller. Moreover, 
the speed with which the U.S. closes its deficit has implications for both how the deficit 
will close and for China. A relatively slow closing makes it feasible for the U.S. to close 
the gap by increasing exports and to continue to increase aggregate imports throughout 
                                                 
43 World Bank (2005). Over the period 2001-2003, China’s imports from Asia have risen by an average 
annual rate of over 31 percent, see Kuroda (2005). China is the dominant engine of growth in the rest of 
Asia. 
44 Over the period 1999-2003 US imports also rapidly. 
  19the process. It also makes it feasible for China to continue to grow rapidly and steadily 
increase its imports.  
 
By contrast, if the U.S. closes, or is forced to close, its external deficit suddenly, 
then there is no way that the closing can be accomplished by an acceleration of the 
growth of exports. A decline in imports would have to account for the bulk of the 
reduction of the deficit. This reduction in demand for foreign goods would, in turn, 
increase the likelihood that China’s exports to the U.S. would also decline, slowing, or 
even halting, growth there and slowing or halting the growth of China’s imports. A rapid 
closing of the U.S. external deficit would mean that both the engines of growth that have 
been propelling the world economy would be grinding to a halt. And the developing 
world would have very little time to adjust to the potentially enormous reduction in 
demand that this would imply. 
 
The likely impact on exports and interest rates in developing countries will 
depend on how the narrowing of the external deficit of the U.S. occurs and on China’s 
response to that narrowing. Here we consider briefly three different scenarios. 
 
In the first scenario, the decline of the U.S. external deficit is relatively slow and 
steady and its impact on China and the rest of the world is relatively benign. For this to 
happen will require substantial changes in policy, principally in the U.S., and it will 
require international cooperation. The dollar will have to continue to decline, in particular 
relative to Asian currencies. This will require China to allow its currency to rise against 
the dollar and for other Asian countries to do the same. The U.S. savings rate will have to 
increase. Since not much can be done about household or corporate savings, this will, 
require an increase in public savings (a decrease in public dissavings). Given the 
constraints on cutting expenditures, a substantial portion of the reduction in the budget 




Assuming these changes in policy occur, then the U.S. current account will close 
over a number of years. Economic growth in the U.S. can be sustained. The demand 
stimulus from the narrowing of the external deficit offsets, at least in part, the 
deflationary impact of raising taxes. In aggregate U.S. imports continue to grow, just not 
as fast as exports. Interest rates in the U.S. rise only modestly. Under these circumstances 
                                                 
45 In the words of Gene Sperling, former economic advisor to President Clinton, “spending restraint alone 
will not be enough to close the hole that the administration’s policies are blowing in the budget. According 
to an analysis by the committee for Economic Development, The Concord Coalition, and Center on Budget 
and Policy Priorities, eliminating deficits of the magnitude we will be facing through spending reductions 
alone would require cutting Social Security by 60 percent, defense spending by 73 percent, or all programs 
outside defense, homeland security, Medicare and Social Security by 40 percent.” See Center for American 
Progress website, http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=14382, December 11, 
2003. 
46 Mussa (2005), p. 3, points out that “all fiscal tightenings are not the same.” While an increase in tax rates 
will depress spending on imports it will also reduce demand for domestic goods, jeopardizing growth. A 
carbon tax will likewise reduce household income and reduce spending generally but it will reduce 
purchases of hydro-carbons, which are disproportionately sourced abroad, disproportionately. Per dollar of 
revenue generated, the carbon tax should be a more effective means of reducing the current account deficit 
than a general tax increase. And it offers the side benefit of helping to reduce global warming. 
  20the adjustment required by China is not that large. In addition to allowing the renminbi to 
rise, it will also have to substitute domestic demand stimulation for the modest decline in 
stimulus that comes from U.S. demand for its exports.
47 China’s external surplus with the 
U.S., and most likely with the rest of the world as a whole will decline and interest rates 
will rise moderately. Growth can continue at a fairly rapid clip and imports will, likewise, 
continue to rise. 
 
Other developing countries will feel the impact of slower growth in the U.S. and 
China and the reduction of the U.S. external deficit. They will also experience moderately 
higher interest rates.  Assuming that they, too, are able to substitute some domestic 
demand growth for the growth of external demand, they should be able to adjust to the 
closing of the U.S. external deficit without a recession.
48
 
There are potential benefits to many developing countries of this relatively benign 
way of reducing the reliance by the U.S. on foreign capital. First, China has actually been 
increasing its competitiveness by riding the dollar down against other currencies. In this 
way, it has achieved a trade-weighted depreciation of about 10 percent over the past three 
years.
49 This has made it more difficult for manufacturers of labor intensive products in 
countries like Lesotho, to compete in international markets and slowed the growth of 
their export oriented manufacturing sectors.
50 A rise in the renminbi, and in other Asian 
currencies that have felt compelled to match the decline of the renminbi, would be a boon 
to the export sectors of many low income countries. 
 
Second, while over the longer term the U.S. fiscal deficit reduces U.S. and global 
savings, the U.S. current account deficit merely redistributes saving from the rest of the 
world to the U.S.
51 That process will be reversed as the U.S. external deficit narrows, 
making more of the world’s savings available for investments in low income countries. 
  
Lowering the negative economic impact on poor countries of U.S. adjustment is a 
third benefit of starting the U.S. adjustment process as soon as possible, before creditors 
force the U.S. to adjust, and spreading the process over a number of years. If the external 
deficit keeps on rising until the ratio of external debt to GDP reaches 40-50 percent then 
the needed adjustment is likely to happen more rapidly, is likely to result more from a 
                                                 
47 The emergence of a middle class in China has resulted in a boom in domestic demand for consumer 
goods. More refrigerators were sold in China in 2003, roughly 11 million, than in the US. But the 
penetration rate is much lower in China, at 43 percent of Chinese households, than in the US at nearly 100 
percent. Clearly potential growth in demand for refrigerators is much higher in China than in the US. The 
same is true for other consumer goods. See Bernstein & Co. (2005), p. 7. 
48  Catherine Mann, (1999), p. 5 writing about the US Trade deficit six years ago, when it was about a third 
of what it is now, was hoping for a slowdown in import growth and an acceleration of export growth as the 
most attractive route back to external balance. But she noted, realistically, that “such a rapid change in the 
growth differential has occurred only rarely, and it could be associated with difficult economic adjustments 
in the United States.” 
49 Bergsten (2005), p. 2. 
50 See Wines, NYT, 03/12/05. 
51 Truman (2004), p. 11. 
  21reduction of U.S. incomes and imports than from an increase in U.S. exports, and is 
therefore likely to cause greater disruption to low income economies.
52
 
The second scenario is a more challenging one for developing countries. As in the 
first scenario, the dollar declines relative to Asian currencies and the U.S. implements the 
fiscal policies necessary to close the current account deficit. But in this scenario the U.S. 
aggregate demand for imports declines because of some combination of slower economic 
growth, which could be triggered by higher interest rates than in the first scenario, and a 
smaller contribution of export growth to the closing of the external deficit. China would, 
most likely, be adversely affected by a decline in the U.S. demand for imports. Its growth 
and, therefore, its demand for imports would then slow. By how much would depend on 
how effective China is in stimulating domestic demand without triggering a surge in 
inflation. 
 
In this scenario, developing countries would be confronted with a decline in U.S. 
demand and a marked slowdown in the growth of demand from China. The growth of 
exports from other developing countries would decline. By how much would influence 
whether economic growth, and poverty reduction, would continue, but at a slower pace, 
or whether many developing countries would slip into recession. The ability of other 
developing countries to stimulate demand would also influence whether recession could 
be avoided. 
 
The third scenario is the least ambiguous and the most negative for the U.S., for 
China and for other developing countries. Often what happens when there is an 
imbalance in a foreign exchange market is that the adjustment happens suddenly.
53 Such 
a discontinuity would generate a global financial tsunami. Both high and low income 
economies would be hit. The tsunami would, most likely, be triggered by a loss of 
confidence in, and a run on, the dollar.
54 Unwillingness by American policy-makers to 
adopt the changes in fiscal policy necessary to reduce both the internal and the external 
deficits could be the cause of the loss of confidence.  
 
The flight from the dollar, in turn, would lead to a spike in interest rates in the 
U.S. and elsewhere and a sharp economic downturn. The “over-heated” real estate market 
in the U.S. is particularly vulnerable to a rise in interest rates.
55 And tapping into the 
                                                 
52 Roubini and Setser (2005a), p. 14; Truman (2004), p. 2. Levey and Brown (2005b), p. 199, seem to miss 
this fundamental point when they argue that there is no urgency about reducing the US budget deficit 
because “tighter US monetary policy and growing bipartisan attention to the fiscal trajectory will 
eventually raise the savings rate….” 
53 Summers (2004) points to 5 incidents of prolonged macro economic imbalance over the past 15 years, 
each of which resolved itself with a costly discontinuity. 
54 If dollars are sold what currencies would be bought? The euro, the yen and the renminbi are the top 
candidates, though the financial markets in Europe, Japan and China are not nearly as large and deep as 
those in the U.S. This is another factor that may postpone the day of reckoning. 
55 Fed Chairman, Alan Greenspan, recently warned that the housing market has become “frothy” and that 
the market is in “an unsustainable underlying pattern.” He pointed to the rapid increases in prices and a 
number of signs that they are being driven, in part, by speculation in real estate.  His warning on housing is 
not dissimilar to his 1996 warning that equities markets were suffering from “irrational exuberance.” It 
took another four years for that bubble to pop. See Andrews, NYT, 05/21/05. The Wall Street Journal 
  22equity in their homes has been a means by which Americans have been able to increase 
their consumption while, for many, earnings have stagnated.
56 The U.S. trade deficit 
would decline as American incomes and investment dropped. The sudden sharp drop in 
the demand for imports together with the rise in interest rates globally would transmit the 
downturn from the U.S. to the rest of the world.
57  
 
Michael Mussa, former chief economist of the IMF, quantifies what such a sudden 
adjustment might look like for the U.S. and the rest of the world:
58
 
“[I]t is possible that the U.S. current account deficit could be substantially 
reduced by a sharp reduction in U.S. expenditure, without any change in the real 
exchange rate.  For example, assuming a U.S. marginal propensity to spend on 
imports of one-quarter, a 10 percent drop in [U.S. expenditure] would, holding 
[U.S. income] constant, improve [the U.S. current account] by just about 2.5 
percent of [national income].  But, 7.5 percent of the 10 percent drop in [national 
expenditure] would fall on domestic demand for domestic goods and services.  
Leaving aside for the moment what is happening in the [rest of the world], this 
exogenous drop in demand would have to be met by a fall in [U.S. income] of 
(about) 7.5 percent, and by further declines in [national expenditure] and [national 
income] through the usual multiplier process.  Working through this multiplier 
process (still assuming that nothing happens in the [rest of the world] and U.S. 
exports are therefore unaffected) yields under plausible assumptions a drop an 
U.S. output of 15 percent, a drop in [national expenditure] of 20 percent and an 
improvement in [the current account] of 5 percent of (initial) [national income].  
But, a 15 percent drop in [national income] means a massive U.S. recession 
on a scale not seen since the 1930s.   
 
Moreover, working through the standard analysis of the effects in the [rest of the 
world] from such large drops in [U.S. expenditure] and [U.S. income], we find 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Hagerty and Simon, 05/23/05), notes that it is increasingly common for people to borrow against the 
equity in their home to speculate on another property, which is the real estate equivalent of buying stocks 
on margin. 
56 In 2004, by refinancing, homeowners extracted roughly $700 billion from the equity in their homes, up 
from roughly $250 billion in 2000. See Hagerty and Simon, WSJ, 05/23/05.  If interest rates spike the 
number and value of refinancings will decline, squeezing consumption (and construction, and employment 
in the construction sector). The fact that, when re-financing, many homeowners, are taking out interest only 
or flexible rate loans, increases the concern because a sharp rise in interest rates would markedly increase 
the mortgage payments of those who have already refinanced and squeeze their capacity to buy consumer 
goods. Krugman, NYT, 05/20/05. 
57 Roubini and Setser (2005a), p. 11, state the issue clearly:  “over time, U.S. imports either have to fall 
back to the level of U.S. exports, or U.S. exports have to rise to the level of U.S. imports. The last thing the 
U.S., or the world, should want is for the U.S. to be forced to make an adjustment of that magnitude 
suddenly. Sudden adjustment typically comes from a fall in imports, not an increase in exports – and likely 
implies a sharp global and U.S. recession.”  
58 Mussa (2005). The assumption here is that all of the reduction in the current account deficit is 
accomplished by a decline in U.S. expenditures, without any change in the real exchange rate or any impact 
on trade flows of a change in the exchange rate. If the adjustment happens suddenly then this is a plausible 
assumption because any change in the exchange rate that might occur, and might actually trigger the crisis, 
will not have time to have an impact on either imports or exports.  
  23significant drops in [rest of the world income] and [expenditure].  For example, if 
[the rest of the world] is roughly three times the size of the U.S., we might 
expect [rest of the world income] to fall by nearly 6 percent and [rest of the 
world expenditure] to fall by about 4 percent.  This yields a worsening of the 
[rest of the world] current account by about 1 2/3 percent of initial [rest of the 
world income] - which would correspond to the improvement in [the U.S. current 
account] by 5 percent of initial [U.S. income].”
59
 
As part of this process, China would be hard hit. It is difficult to imagine how 
China could compensate quickly for the loss of external demand. More likely, China 
would fall into recession and it, too, would experience a sharp drop in the demand for 
imports. The combination of the world’s two leading engines of growth simultaneously 
moving from fast forward into reverse would have a big adverse impact on developing 
countries. There is nothing in their policy arsenals that could markedly reduce the 
negative impact of what is likely to be a global economic downturn. 
 
 
E.  A Benign Unwinding Versus a “Financial Tsunami”: The Role of U.S. Fiscal Policy 
 
It is in everyone’s interest to follow the relatively benign path to re-establishing 
global macro-economic balance. Because it is so much in their interest to do so, other 
countries, China notable among them, will undoubtedly be willing to cooperate by 
changing policies influencing exchange rates and the level and composition of demand. 
But the locus of the problem is in the U.S. Changes in foreign economic policy, on their 
own will not fully correct the problem. To help resolve the problem in a relatively benign 
way, these countries will require U.S. leadership. This raises a key issue. What if that 
leadership is not forthcoming? Granted, that is hard to imagine, since it is so much in the 
interest of the U.S. that a crisis be avoided. And because the world is so accustomed to 
the U.S. taking the lead when there is a major global economic problem that must be 
resolved.
60 But imagine it we must, if only because over the last four years the Bush 
administration has declined to assume global leadership on this issue. 
 
To assess the probability of following a benign path to the re-establishment of 
global macro-economic balance relative to achieving balance via a sharp, sudden 
discontinuity, we need to clarify what will be the key determinant of which path will be 
followed.  For the U.S. to reduce its dependence on foreign capital by following the 
benign path will require time and substantial additional foreign capital. At present, what 
is protecting the world economy from a discontinuity is the demand for dollars generated 
by a few Asian central bankers. The key determinant then has to do with what it will take 
to sustain substantial, though diminishing, foreign capital inflows into the U.S.  
 
In a word that determinant is “credibility.” If those who control foreign capital— 
whether central bankers or private investors—are convinced that the U.S. is on the path to 
reduced dependence on foreign capital then the time and the money necessary to follow 
                                                 
59 Mussa (2005), p. 2.  
60 It was the U.S. that took the lead in Mexico in 1994 and in East Asia in 1997. 
  24the benign path is likely to be made available. If, on the other hand, those who control 
foreign capital come to believe that the U.S. is not taking the actions necessary to reduce 
its dependence on foreign capital and may even be taking actions that will increase it, 
then they will be likely to come to view a discontinuity as inevitable.
61 The belief in that 
inevitability will then become a self-fulfilling prophecy if it leads them to try to protect 
themselves by reducing their appetite for dollars.
62
 
While a factual analysis of the ability of the U.S. to sustain the growth of foreign 
debt will have an influence on the appetite of foreigners for dollars and American assets, 
perhaps more important than the reality itself will be the perception by foreigners of what 
that reality is. This has two implications. First, if the U.S. faces a financial crisis, in the 
form of a run on the dollar, it is less likely to be a crisis of solvency than a crisis of 
liquidity. In other words, the crisis will not be determined by a precise calculation that the 
U.S. is insolvent or that the rate at which it is accumulating debt is not sustainable.
63 
Rather, it will be determined by a more amorphous assessment of the future magnitude of 
U.S. foreign debt and the value of the dollar.  
 
Second, if all this sounds rather subjective, that is because it is. How foreign 
holders of capital perceive the burden of U.S. foreign debt – and how Europeans view 
how the Chinese perceive U.S. foreign debt—is more important than any objective 
assessment of that burden.
64 This need to take into account the subjective perceptions of 
foreign investors is, in itself, a symptom of the problem. For the past 100 years or more, 
the financial strength of the U.S. was so great as to be self-evident. American assets were 
                                                 
61 As Truman (2004), p. 18 puts it: “It is difficult to imagine how the United States could achieve a 
substantial correction of the external deficit and still maintain a large fiscal deficit because of the size of the 
implied drop in the rate of domestic investment that would be involved.” 
62 Gramlich (2004) discusses a “credibility range” within which the external deficit does not have a large 
impact on asset prices, interest rates or exchange rates. Truman (2004) suggests that when the external 
deficit becomes sufficiently large or has been expanding, the credibility range narrows, confidence in U.S. 
financial policy is undermined and the risk of a crisis rises. 
63 These are not simple calculations to make. At present U.S. foreign debt is over 30 percent of GDP, and 
rising. The danger zone for developing countries is when debt exceeds 40 percent. The U.S. appears to be 
fast approaching that mark. But, on the optimistic side, allowance has to be made for the fact that most U.S. 
foreign debt is denominated in dollars rather than in a foreign currency whereas the debt of developing 
countries is largely denominated in dollars. A depreciation of the currency of a developing country, which 
should contribute to a reduction of its external deficit, also, unfortunately, increases the value of its foreign 
debt. For the U.S. this is not true. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the U.S. earns a substantially higher 
return on its foreign investments than foreigners earn on their investments in the U.S. Just comparing the 
flows of earnings on foreign assets suggests that that the U.S., net, is not as heavily indebted as a 
comparison of foreign assets does. Both these factors suggest that the burden of foreign debt on the U.S. 
economy may be lower than commonly thought. See Cline (forthcoming). On the other side, some analysts 
argue that if you take account of the unfunded liabilities of the federal government the true level of 
government debt, hence the amount of debt that will have to be funded by foreigners, is currently in excess 
of the value of US assets, implying that the US has a negative net worth and is currently insolvent. See 
Peterson (2004); Bernasek, BYT, 05/01/05. 
64 As Fallows (2005) p. 56 puts it, hyperbolically, “if any of the Asian countries piling up dollars began to 
suspect that any other was about to unload them, all the countries would have an incentive to sell dollars as 
fast as possible, before they got stuck with worthless currency.”  
  25appealing in part because foreigners did not perceive any systemic risk in the U.S.
65 Now, 
in addition to assessing the risk associated with any particular American investment, 
foreigners have to be concerned about systemic risk, no matter how small they may 
perceive it to be. 
 
The outstanding burden of external debt poses one challenge to maintenance of 
U.S. credibility. When, under Ronald Reagan, the U.S. began to run large external 
deficits, U.S. external debt, net, was zero and U.S. assets as a share of foreign investment 
portfolios was very small. In 1980 it would be hard to imagine a more credit-worthy 
borrower. If the U.S. wanted to borrow, foreigners were more than happy to lend. Not 
only has the annual amount that the U.S. asks foreigners to lend surged from next to 
nothing in 1980 to over $700 billion in 2005, but that borrowing is now on top of existing 
net borrowings of over $3 trillion. Dollar denominated assets as a share of foreign 
investment portfolios have also risen sharply.
66 Moreover, even without any increases in 
the external deficit, the net external liabilities of the U.S. are on a path to more than 
double over the next four years, to $7.4 trillion at the end of 2008.
67
 
Perhaps a more important challenge to maintaining credibility than the history of 
borrowing are forecasts of how much borrowing the U.S. may need to do decades in the 
future. The U.S. has a serious long-term fiscal problem.
68 This is well known. The aging 
of the population of the U.S. population is a major contributing factor. The Congressional 
Budget Office forecasts that, without any change in policies, the federal government 
deficit will rise from an estimated 3.6 percent deficit in 2004 to a striking 14.4 percent 
deficit in 2050.
69 Less than 20 percent of the increase in the deficit would be due to the 
Social Security financing deficit. Nearly 80 percent of the increase is expected to result 
from high medicare and medicaid expenditures.
70  
 
Few believe that the deficit will actually rise to 14 percent of GDP, but neither 
does anyone yet know the policy changes that will be implemented as a means of 
lowering that deficit, nor how effective they will prove to be. The fact that the U.S. is 
currently perceived by both citizens and foreigners to be on a dangerous path can only 
                                                 
65 Indeed, this may be one reason why returns on foreign holdings on U.S. assets are so much lower than 
returns on American holdings of foreign assets. Because the U.S. has been such a safe market, foreigners 
may place the low-risk, low-return portion of their portfolios there while U.S. residents place the higher-
risk, higher return portion of their portfolios in less safe foreign markets. Cline (forthcoming). 
66 Over the decade 1992-2002 U.S. external liabilities rose from rough 5.7 percent of the value of the gross 
financial assets of the rest of the world to roughly 13.2 percent. Cline (forthcoming). 
67 Roubini and Setser (2005a), p. 13. 
68 Fallows (2005), p. 53, summarizes the message of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on this 
subject:” the basic operating costs of the federal government (interest payments, Social Security, and 
Medicare and Medicaid – the unglamorous long-term payments it is legally committed to make) is 
growing, and the money to cover them is not.” 
69 CBO (2003). Again, this forecast does not take account of changes in tax laws that have yet to be 
adopted.  
70 In 2003 Congress added prescription-drug coverage to Medicare, without much consideration of its long 
term fiscal impact, thereby adding nearly $13 trillion to the government’s long-term commitments and 
prompting the government’s comptroller to say that 2003, also a year in which tax cuts were passed,” was 
the most reckless fiscal year in the history of the Republic.” See Fallows (2005), p. 54.  
  26undermine the attempt to maintain credibility as the U.S. seeks to borrow larger and 
larger sums from foreigners. To get off that dangerous path will require considerable 
political will and bi-partisan cooperation. The increase in partisanship, and the decline in 
cooperation and compromise, in American politics and government must be a source of 
growing concern to foreigners. It must plant a seed of doubt that the U.S., without being 
forced by outsiders, has the ability to do what must be done.  
 
How well the U.S. deals with its current fiscal challenge will undoubtedly 
influence the assessment by foreigners of the capacity of the U.S. to deal with its much 
larger long-run fiscal challenge. The current fiscal challenge is a test that is being closely 
watched by foreign investors. We noted that between 2000 and 2004 there was a large, 6 
percent, fiscal deterioration in the U.S., from a surplus of 2.4 percent to a deficit of 3.6 
percent. Some of that deterioration was accounted for by increases in federal government 
spending, which rose from 18.4 to 19.9 percent of GDP.
71 Most of deterioration was the 
result of a decline in tax revenues from 20.9 to 16.2 percent of GDP, the lowest tax 
revenues have been as a percentage of GDP since 1959.
72 This 6 percent reduction in 
public savings, in turn, accounted for nearly all of the increase in the domestic resource 
gap and in the U.S. current account deficit. 
 
With a large stock of external debt and, unless policies are changed, borrowing 
requirements a few decades in the future that will dwarf the borrowing the U.S. has done 
in the past, means it will not be a simple matter for the U.S. to maintain its financial 
credibility. Essential to doing so will be the demonstration to the rest of the world that the 
U.S. has the will and the means to substantially reduce an external deficit that has been 
steadily growing over the past four years. And to reverse the trend in the external deficit, 
there really is no policy alternative: the fiscal deterioration of the last four years will have 
to be reversed.  
 
The Bush administration, at least implicitly, recognizes this. The administration 
claims it will reduce the budget deficit as a share of GDP. In the words of the President, 
“I have pledged to cut the deficit in half by 2009, and we are on track to do so.”
73 The 
CBO foresees nearly a halving of the annual budget deficit by 2010, to 1.9 percent of 
GDP. Unfortunately, there are two serious problems with this forecast. First, the forecast 
is not realistic because it is inconsistent with other stated policy goals of the 
administration. For example, the CBO’s forecasts do not take account of three initiatives, 
each of which, if enacted, will have a large adverse impact on the federal government 
deficit: making the tax cuts of 2001 permanent, reducing the impact of the alternative 
                                                 
71 Because of declining interest rates, federal government interest expense on the national debt actually fell 
by 0.9 percent of GDP implying that other government expenditures actually increased by 2.4 percent of 
GDP. Cline (forthcoming). 
72 While that decline was largely due to cuts in tax rates, some of it was due to the reduction in revenues 
from capital gains taxes that resulted from the popping of the stock bubble in 2000. The Economic Report 
of the President in 2005 asserts, incorrectly, that only 25 percent of the fiscal deterioration is due to the tax 
cuts. CEA (2005). 
73 CEA (2005). 
  27minimum tax on middle-income groups and introducing a private account alternative 
within the current Social Security system.
74  
 
Unfortunately, forecasts by independent analysts that take account of at least 
some of the policy changes proposed by the Bush administration predict that with regard 
to the deficit, the administration will fail to do what it says it will do. Rather than a 
decline in the budget deficit as a share of GDP, they see the deficit remaining in the 3.5-
4.5 range until 2014.
75 The implication is clear: if public savings do not increase then, in 
the absence of a rise in private savings or a decline in investment, which are only likely to 
occur if there is an economic downturn, then the domestic resource gap and the external 
deficit will not decline as a share of GDP. If it remains constant, and the economy 
sustains growth of 3 percent a year, then within ten years the annual external deficit of 
the U.S. will rise from the current $700 billion to over $1 trillion. 
 
The second problem with the Bush administration deficit reduction goal is that, 
even if it could be achieved, it is doubtful that it is sufficiently ambitious. Cline 
(forthcoming) has developed a formal computable general equilibrium model that links 
the U.S. fiscal balance to balance in the current account.
76 And here is what he 
concluded:  
 
“Various simulations with the model show that fiscal adjustment of a given 
amount tends to yield a trade balance adjustment that is about 40 percent as large; 
that an exogenous initial decline in the dollar by itself has only a limited effect on 
the current account; and the most effective external adjustment occurs when an 
exchange rate decline is accompanied by a sizable fiscal adjustment. The main 
thrust of the analysis is to emphasize the crucial role of fiscal adjustment. With 
the assumed parameters, the model estimates indicate that the size of the fiscal 
adjustment would need to be 4 percent of GDP, even if accompanied by a 20 
percent decline in the dollar and a modest temporary acceleration in foreign 
growth, in order to curb the trade deficit from its initial level of 5.2 percent of 
GDP to 3.1 percent.”
77
 
The Bush administration goal of reducing the fiscal deficit to 1.9 percent of GDP 
will make only a small dent in the current account deficit. It will require a reduction in 
the fiscal deficit, 2-2.5 times what the administration hopes to accomplish, to cut the 
external deficit, by roughly one third, to 3.5 of GDP. At a minimum, to substantially 
reduce the external deficit it is necessary to once again move the federal government 
                                                 
74 Under the present system, money flowing into the Social Security system helps pay current retirees. 
Because money that flows into private accounts won’t be available to current retirees, trillions of dollars of 
government borrowing will be required to fund the transition to the new system, if adopted. 
75 See Gale and Orszag (2004) and Cline (forthcoming). 
76 Among its equations are “the national accounts identity; the relationship of consumption to disposable 
income; investment as a function of the interest rate and GDP; the real exchange rate as function of the 
interest rate and domestic relative to foreign growth; the interest rates as a function of the size of the fiscal 
deficit, the excess of GDP over its potential, and the price level; and the price level as a function of the 
level of GDP and the level of the real exchange rate.” Cline (forthcoming). 
77 Cline (forthcoming). 
  28budget from large deficits to surpluses. But there is no plan to do that. Even if there was, 
it is not clear whether reducing the current account deficit from roughly $700 billion a 




What is disturbingly clear is that the combination of the Bush administration’s 
modest goal for reducing the fiscal deficit, together with the high likelihood that even that 
goal will not be achieved means that, without a crisis, little or no progress will be made in 
reducing the U.S. current account deficit. Cline (forthcoming) forecasts external deficits 
rising from 5.7 percent of GDP in 2004 to about 7.5 percent by 2010, and other analysts 
are even more pessimistic. If there aren’t major changes in U.S. policy they see the 
external deficit growing to 8-12 percent of GDP by 2010.
79 This means that the U.S. will, 
in fairly short order, require well over $1 trillion a year to fill its domestic resource gap. 
If indeed the financial credibility of the U.S. depends on making substantial progress 
toward reducing its dependence on foreign capital, then this growing reliance on foreign 
capital, in turn, implies that U.S. financial credibility will be seriously at risk.  
 
 
F.  A Crisis: Potential Triggers  
 
What happens if, in the eyes, of foreign investors the U.S. does lose financial 
credibility? Clearly the risk of a discontinuity in foreign exchange markets, of a run on 
the dollar and all that that implies, rises. There are a number of factors that, alone or in 
unison, could trigger such a run. First, the central banks of Asia could begin to lose their 
appetite for dollars despite the fact that currently there is what Summers calls “a balance 
of financial terror.” The short run cost to Asian economies of a financial tsunami could be 
as high as the cost to the U.S., giving the central bankers a powerful reason to sustain the 
dollar and avoid a recession in the U.S. for as long as possible.  
 
That said, the central banks have, with respect to dollars, in effect, become the 
source of demand of last resort. The more dollars they accumulate the greater the 
financial loss to them when the “inevitable” decline of the dollar does occur.
80 Perhaps 
even more important, accumulating dollars can result in a too rapid increase in their 
domestic money supply, fuelling inflation. At some point these costs may outweigh the 
benefits of supporting the dollar. It is unlikely that the bankers would do anything 
draconian. Rather they would be likely to try to let the dollar down gently, but may 
trigger a run and lose control of the situation. 
                                                 
78 Roubini and Setser (2005a), p. 9 agree. Their analysis indicates that a reduction of the external deficit to 
3.5 percent is not sufficient. Rather to keep the ratio of U.S. debt to GDP from rising, it will be necessary to 
cut the external deficit to 1 percent. See also Truman (2004), p. 9. Again, to achieve this will require that 
the federal budget be in surplus. 
79 Summers (2004); Mann (2004). 
80 “A 20 percent increase in the value of the [renminbi] against the dollar would reduce the value of China’s 
roughly $450 billion in dollar reserves by about $100 billion – 6 percent of China’s GDP. In four years, if 
nothing changes, Chinese dollar reserves could reach $1.4 trillion, raising the costs of a falling dollar to 
$300 billion – some 12 percent of China’s GDP”. See Roubini and Setser (2005b), p. 196. 
  29If the U.S. external deficit remains constant as a share of U.S. GDP, and foreign 
private capital continues to shun the U.S., then the number of dollars the Asian central 
banks will have to accumulate will steadily rise. If the current account deficit grows as a 
share of GDP then the number of dollars they will have to accumulate is that much larger. 
Further compounding the problem is the fact that many American investors (and foreign 
private investors with American holdings), seeing the writing on the wall, are reallocating 
their portfolios and increasing the share of assets not denominated in dollars.  
 
A few notable examples: over the past two years Warren Buffet, one of the 
country’s most savvy investors, has shifted over $12 billion out of dollars into assets 
denominated in other currencies.
81 Likewise, the Harvard University endowment, one of 
the nation’s most successful institutional investors, has substantially increased the share 
of its $20 plus billion portfolio that it is allocating to foreign investments.
82 And, because 
it believes the dollar will decline and that the expected returns on foreign equities are 
higher than on American equities, Alliance capital is recommending that a higher share of 
the $400 billion it has under management be invested abroad.
83 This reallocation by 
private investors increases the number of dollars that Asian central banks, as the 




When will the Asian central banks approach their limit with regard to the 
accumulation of dollars? No one knows. But the more they are asked to buy the sooner 
that day will come. To trigger a decline in the dollar the banks do not need to sell dollars 
they simply need to accumulate them at a rate slower than they are being made available. 
Recently the Korean central bank indicated that it was considering holding new reserves 
in currencies other than the dollar. They were not proposing to sell dollars. The currency 
market immediately drove down the value of the dollar, until the Koreans indicated that 
they had been “misunderstood.”
86 Might this be a sign of what is to come?
87
  
The growing dependence of the U.S. on “loans” from foreign central banks, 
wittingly or unwittingly, involves a transfer of power.
88 There is little doubt that China’s 
leaders not only want their country to be wealthy, they want it to be, and to be recognized 
as, a great power. There are hard-liners inside the Chinese government who believe that 
                                                 
81 Reuters, NYT, 03/08/04. 
82 Fabrikant, NYT, 05/22/05. 
83 Bernstein & Co. (2005).  
84 In aggregate, Americans bought more foreign stocks than foreigners bought American equities in both 
2003 and 2004. The result in 2004: a net equity outflow of $160 billion that had to be financed, in addition 
to the current account deficit of $666 billion. See Roubini and Setser (2005), p. 13. 
85 Should the U.S. truly lose credibility, convincing investors that a further large decline in the value of the 
dollar is inevitable, the reallocation out of dollar denominated assets could markedly increase. 
86 Dougherty and Fuerbringer, NYT, 03/23/05 and Korea Times, 04/10/05. 
87 Summers (2004), p. 10 has warned that quasi fixed exchange rate systems which require heavy central 
bank intervention “have enormous capacity to create an illusory sense of stability that could be shattered 
very quickly. That is the lesson of Britain in 1992, of Mexico in 1994, of emerging Asia in 1997, of Russia 
in 1998, and of Brazil in 1998.” 
88 As Truman (2004), p. 13 says “…countries that are large international debtors find it more of a challenge 
to exert leadership in political as well as economic spheres”. 
  30China is vying with the U.S. for leadership in Asia and a confrontation with the U.S. is 
likely. One way for China to assert that leadership, and have it widely recognized, would 
be to take Taiwan by force and, should the U.S. threaten to intervene, for China to 
threaten to sell dollars.
89 If the U.S. backed down, the world would know. If it did not, 
the U.S. could find itself simultaneously in a military conflict and in a sharp economic 
downturn. Just how far-fetched is this scenario is unclear, but it does illustrate the fact 
that, to a disconcerting extent, the economic welfare of the American people, is now in 
the hands of a few Communist Chinese central bankers. And that in a political conflict 
with the U.S. it will be tempting for China to play its ace in the hole, its dollar card. 
 
An “accident” in the trillion dollar a day market for derivatives—forward markets 
that allow corporations, banks, and investors to hedge currency or interest rate risks or to 
speculate—could be another trigger. To cover bets that went wrong a speculator in the 
forward market for dollars, for example, could be forced to sell large quantities of dollars 
on the spot market, stimulating a run on the dollar. Because the markets for derivatives 
are so complex and so large and so unregulated, not enough is known about them to 
gauge the risk. But it is another source of concern. 
 
It is probably the case that the trigger would be some event that we have not 
imagined. If trends continue as they are the international financial system will become 
increasingly unstable. An event which a decade ago would not have much of an impact 
will come to have the potential to tip the entire system into crisis. 
 
 
G.  In Conclusion: To Help the Poor, Stop Playing Russian Roulette With the U.S. Economy 
 
Generally, when evaluating risk associated with a social or economic problem or 
a policy, the public tends to be more negative in its assessment than the experts who are 
most familiar with the issues. For example, the risk the public assigns to nuclear power 
generation is much higher than the risk assigned by the scientists and engineers who work 
in the nuclear power industry or in academia and have better command of the facts and 
their implications. The relative ignorance of the public makes them more fearful.  
 
With respect to the issues regarding global macro-economic imbalance, the 
opposite appears to be the case. The public is worried about the American economy, 
despite strong growth and low inflation and interest rates: in a May, 2005 survey “only 
one in three Americans think the national economy is in good shape.”
90 And they are 
concerned about the budget deficit. But they do not seem to understand the link between 
the budget and the current account deficit and the full extent of the risk that these deficits 
                                                 
89 James Fallows (2005) suggests another scenario. An attempted coup in Venezuela fails. Chavez blames 
the U.S. and imposes an embargo on oil exports to the US. (The Amuay refinery in Venezuela satisfies one 
eighth of the U.S. demand for gasoline.) The resulting oil shock triggers a run on the dollar, reinforced by 
the decision of China’s central bank to no longer aggressively support the dollar.  
90 Pew Research Center for the People and the Press as reported in AP, June 2, 2005. 
  31pose. The public’s fear is diffuse.
91 The public does not appear to know enough about the 
issues, which are quite complex, to focus their fear on U.S. foreign indebtedness.
92  
 
Another reason for the lack of serious concern by the public may be the fact that 
the Bush administration has not emphasized the problem of the U.S. external imbalance. 
The Economic Report of the President, page 31, notes that in 2004 the trade deficit “rose 
in the third quarter to a record high as a percentage of GDP,” and acknowledges that a 
decline in the savings rate is a contributing factor. However, it is quite sanguine about 
how a decline in the dollar, faster growth of U.S. trading partners and slower growth in 
the U.S. will reduce the deficit. There is no discussion about whether the President’s goal 
of reducing the budget deficit by half is sufficient with regard to its impact on the current 
account deficit. Nor is there any discussion of the risks associated with rapidly growing 
foreign debt, and the role of Asian central banks. 
 
A third reason for the lack of serious concern about the growing U.S. debt to 
foreigners has to do with the bond market. Under ordinary circumstances, if there were 
insufficient domestic savings to fund investment in the U.S. and the federal budget 
deficit, and foreign private investors were unwilling to fill the gap, then the dollar would 
fall and interest rates would rise. But the current circumstances are anything but ordinary. 
The dollar is being kept above what the foreign exchange market would determine and 
interest rates are being kept below what the bond market would determine if they were 
free to do so, by the purchases by Asian central banks of dollars and government 
securities. These markets are like canaries in a coal mine. They provide early warning of 
danger. But in this case foreign intervention in these markets have in effect, removed the 
canaries. And so the public and the media are lulled into complacency.  
 
By contrast professional economists are much more seriously concerned.
93 They 
have a better understanding of the complexity of the situation and understand why the 
early warning canaries are not fulfilling their role. The Economist recently surveyed a 
random sample of the referees of the American Economic Review, the scholars that 
screen the pieces submitted for publication in perhaps the nation’s most distinguished 
scholarly economics journal. Admittedly economists tend to be rather fiscally 
conservative. 75 percent of those surveyed considered the fiscal policy of the Bush 
administration to be a serious problem and 20 percent characterized U.S. macro-
economic imbalance as a “crisis.”
94  
 
And the international financial institutions charged with maintaining global 
macro-economic stability are also concerned. The IMF issued on May 25 its  
"Concluding Statement of the IMF Mission" from its "consultation with the United States 
                                                 
91 Some commentators explain the poor performance of the stock market in 2005, despite apparently sound 
fundamentals, on the sense that big macro-economic problems are looming just over the horizon. See 
White, Washington Post, 04/03/05; Fallows (2005). 
92 CEA (2005), pp. 37-38. 
93  Kolbert, The New Yorker, 05/02/05 reports that, like with global macro-imbalance and contrary to the 
usual pattern, with regard to global warming it is the experts who are most deeply concerned.  The public is 
either oblivious or assumes that the problem will be solved. 
94 The Economist, 10/07/04. 
  32of America." They say "external imbalances present a significant risk to the global 
 economy. The U.S. current account deficit and its counterparts elsewhere 
in the world are widely viewed as unsustainable. A gradual adjustment of the 
 U.S. external position and exchange rate remains the most likely scenario, 
 especially if it involves stronger growth in the rest of the world. The challenge is to 
support the adjustment by stronger U.S. national saving to avoid the burden falling on 
investment and growth, both in the U.S. and abroad. Moreover, there will be limits to the 
global demand for U.S. assets, and there is a risk that an abrupt and disorderly shift in 




The Basel-based Bank for International Settlements, the central bankers' bank, 
just issued its annual report in which it said that is impossible to predict when 
international economic imbalances would unravel in a disorderly manner but "time might 
well be running out." The BIS urged the U.S. to act to correct imbalances. They noted 
that the ever widening external deficit of the U.S. "could eventually lead to a disorderly 




Peter G. Peterson, Commerce Secretary under Nixon, concurs that the problem is 
a serious one. He said, in language less measured than that used by the IFIs “… I think 
these unprecedented twin deficits are great risks that a great country should not be taking. 
And I am not simply talking about the economic risk, I am talking about the national 
security risk, of betting how long the biggest debtor and the biggest borrower can also be 
a great leader and a great super power.”
97 And Robert Rubin, Treasury Secretary under 
Clinton has written: 
 
“…Dangerously, if markets here and abroad begin to fear long-term fiscal 
disarray and our related trade imbalances, those markets could then demand 
sharply higher interest rates for providing long-term debt capital and could put 
abrupt and sharp downward pressure on the dollar. These market effects…could 
seriously undermine our economy…. Of course, we can continue to close our eyes 
and hope for the best. There’s no way to predict whether that will work for 
another few month or for many more years. But…we place ourselves at great peril 
by not facing these realities.”
98
 
With regard to timing Paul Volcker, Greenspan’s predecessor as the head of the 
Federal Reserve, is more specific, saying that, unless there is a marked change in policy, 
the probability of a financial crisis within the next five years is 75 percent.
99 The 
Financial Times asserted that U.S. external debt “is starting to resemble a pyramid 
scheme.” And, perhaps most ominously, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, in 
                                                 
95 IMF (2005). 
96 BIS (2005), p. 145 and p. 144. 
97 In a roundtable discussion at the Institute of International Economics, August 9, 2004. 
98 Rubin, NYT, 05/13/05. 
99 Krugman, NYT, 09/10/04. 
  332005, Fan Gang, the director of the National Economic Research Institute, an influential 
nongovernmental organization in China, warned that “the U.S. dollar is no longer seen as 
a stable currency.”
100 Paraphrasing Churchill, and alluding to the lack of concern by the 
government and the public about the U.S. macroeconomic problem, Larry Summers, also 
Treasury Secretary under Clinton, asserted “the only thing we have to fear is the lack of 
fear itself.”
101
The Center for Global Development and Foreign Policy magazine have developed 
the Commitment to Development Index which ranks 21 of the world's richest countries 
based on their dedication to policies that benefit the 5 billion people living in poorer 
nations worldwide. In 2004 the U.S. ranked seventh, a quite creditable ranking. Moving 
beyond standard comparisons of foreign aid volumes,
 the index also rates countries on the 
quality of foreign aid, openness to developing-country exports, policies that influence 
investment, migration policies, support for creation of new technologies, security policies 
and environmental policies.
102, 103  
In the trade category, the U.S. scores first because its tariffs on agricultural goods 
are relatively low and because of relatively low tariffs on, and high imports of, 
manufactured goods from developing countries.
104 The index does not take account of a 
country’s rate of growth of imports from developing countries. If it did, the overall 
ranking of the U.S. would undoubtedly be higher because of the U.S. role as an engine of 
growth for both high and low income countries. 
How the U.S. reduces its dependence on foreign capital will be a test of the U.S. 
commitment to development. If the U.S. changes course and reduces its domestic 
resource gap by increasing public savings by more than the administration has, to date, 
promised, then the likelihood of a relatively benign reduction of global macro-economic 
imbalance increases. The additional foreign capital the U.S. will need during the 
potentially lengthy transition to lower trade deficits will be made available, by both high 
and low income surplus countries. If this happens, there is a good chance that the growth 
of poor economies and reductions in the number of the poor will continue. Following this 
path is good for the U.S. and good for the developing world. Leading the world down this 
path will strengthen the perception, worldwide, that the U.S. is seriously committed to 
benefiting the poor of the world. 
If the U.S. does not succeed in substantially increasing public savings and 
continues, therefore, to be highly dependent on foreign capital and the result is a loss of 
financial credibility, a run on the dollar and sharply higher interest rates, the story is not a 
                                                 
100 The Financial Times and Fan Gang are both quoted in Fallows (2005). 
101 Summers (2004). 
102 The U.S. is near the bottom of the ranking with regard foreign assistance as a proportion of GNP. The 
European Union has committed to doubling its assistance to 0.7 percent of GNP by 2015. The U.S. 
currently only gives 0.18 percent of GNP. 
103 Foreign Policy (2004). 
104 “Three fourths of the trade score is based on barriers to exports from developing countries—tariffs, 
quotas, and subsidies for farmers in rich countries. Higher barriers yield lower scores. The remainder 
measures how much rich nations import from developing countries.” See Foreign Policy (2004). 
  34happy one. The progress that low income countries are making with regard to poverty 
reduction will grind to a halt. A decline in imports by the U.S. from low income countries 
will be a contributing factor and will weaken the position of the U.S. in the Commitment 
to Development Index. But, irrespective of what the index says, if the U.S. is seen to be 
responsible for derailing progress toward the elimination of global poverty, and pushing 
poor countries into a potentially deep and long recession, the U.S. reputation for being 
committed to development will be left in tatters and George Bush’s assertion that “my job 
as the president is to lead this nation into making the world a better place” will be seen as 
cynical empty rhetoric.
105
I emphasize again that the interest of China and other developing countries in the 
benign resolution of the global macro-economic imbalance is so strong that, if the U.S. 
leads the way and does the right thing these countries, too, are likely to do the right thing. 
They will agree to adjust their exchange rates and stimulate domestic demand as a 
substitute for diminished foreign demand.  
 
They are much less likely to do the right thing if the U.S. fails to do the right 
thing, and continues to lecture them about their responsibility to do the right thing. There 
has been a notable contradiction over the past five years between U.S. foreign policy— 
unilateralist and disdainful of our friends—and U.S. foreign economic policy—turning to 
our trading partners as a supplicant, tin cup in hand. But even those countries most 
perturbed by the new “go it alone” foreign policy stance of the U.S., and amazed by the 
contradiction between U.S. foreign policy and U.S. foreign economic policy, recognize 
that it is in their interest to work with the U.S. to avoid a global financial tsunami. 
 
One way to look at a financial trend such as a rapid rise in stock or real estate 
prices, that no longer appears to be driven by the usual fundamentals, is simply to 
extrapolate the recent history of the trend and conclude that it is likely to continue into 
the indefinite future. The expectation that the rise will continue is seen as a money-
making opportunity: buy now when prices are high and sell later when they are still 
higher. That the continuation of the trend requires ever higher ratios of stock prices to 
earnings or real estate prices to rents, is dismissed by assumptions that there is some new, 
not fully understood, fundamental determinant that is now driving the market.
106 This 
extrapolation of prices is not fully rational; it provides the hot air necessary to inflate a 
speculative bubble.
107
                                                 
105 Quoted in Mallaby, The Washington Post, 04/19/04. 
106 Just before the stock market bubble deflated in 2000, after having nearly tripled in value over the 
previous six years to reach 11,000, a book was published with the title, Dow 36,000: The New Strategy for 
Profiting From the Coming Rise in the Stock Market”, which offered reasons for a further tripling of the 
market. See Glassman and Hassett (2000). Today, after one of the great real estate booms in American 
history, it is not difficult to find tracts explaining why the real estate price rise will continue and explaining 
how to cash in on it.  
107 Shiller (2004), p. 2 sees “irrational exuberance”, a term taken from Greenspan’s 1996 speech, as the 
psychological basis for a speculative bubble. He defines a speculative bubble as “a situation in which news 
of price increases spurs investor enthusiasm, which spreads by psychological contagion from person to 
person, in the process amplifying stories that might justify the price increases and bringing in a larger and 
larger class of investors, who, despite doubts about the real value of an investment, are drawn to it partly 
through envy of others’ successes and partly through a gambler’s excitement.” 
  35Simply extrapolating a price trend is the equivalent of concluding that the longer 
the trend continues, the higher the probability that it will continue for the next month or 
year.
108 The alternative is to conclude that the longer a trend continues, and the wider the 
gap between the trend in the price and the trends in key determinants, the sooner the trend 
will cease.
109  The skeptics are often the first to admit that they do not know precisely 
when the trend will cease. Directly contrary to those who are irrationally exuberant, the 
skeptics are convinced that the longer the trend continues the higher the probability that, 
within the next month or the next year, or the next three years, it will end. 
 
What does this discussion of speculative bubbles have to do with the U.S. 
dependence on external capital and the solution to that problem? After all, bubbles are the 
consequence of the beliefs and the behavior of individual investors, not the beliefs and 
actions of governments. But that is precisely the point. Over the past several years, the 
U.S. government has, on a number of key occasions, behaved as if it is an irrationally 
exuberant investor rather than as an analytically astute and skeptical steward of the public 
good, its appointed and historic role. 
 
For example, in 2001, the administration forecast an aggregate budget surplus of 
$5.6 trillion between 2001 and 2010. It seemed only fair to reduce this surplus and lower 
taxes. Moreover, if the surplus was not reduced, it was argued, it could cause financial 
problems.  After all, between the nation’s founding and 2001 the U.S. had only 
accumulated $3.2 trillion in debt. An aggregate surplus in excess of government 
obligations means the retirement of all government debt and the end of the government 
bond market as we know it. So in addition to being fair, reducing taxes as a means of 
reducing the surplus seemed to be a prudent thing to do. Alan Greenspan agreed and leant 
his moral authority to the tax cut proposal. A dozen Democrats in the Senate joined the 
Republicans in passing legislation that would reduce tax revenues by far more than 
required for fiscal stimulus to counteract the recession. 
 
The problem was that the forecast of a $5.6 trillion surplus had about as much 
merit as the forecast of the Dow reaching 36,000. The surplus forecast was essentially an 
extrapolation of the recent trend in tax revenues. Those revenues were rising sharply, 
from 17.5 percent of GDP in 1994 to nearly 21 percent in 2000 partly because of higher 
tax rates and partly because of revenue generated by taxes on capital gains accumulated 
as the speculative bubble inflated.
110  
 
Once the bubble burst in 2000, any small town accountant would tell you that, 
based on experience with clients, the revenue generated by taxes on capital gains was 
about to plummet, as in fact it did, to 16 percent of GDP, for the simple reason that 
capital gains themselves had already plummeted.  But the government chose to ignore the 
                                                 
108 After all, those who forecast that the trend would end sometime over the past year were proved to be 
wrong. 
109 There were bears who, in 1998 and 1999, believed that what was happening in the market for tech 
stocks was sheer folly. They stayed on the sidelines. The opportunity cost of doing so was substantial but, 
then again, when the bubble burst, they did not suffer the 90 percent declines in their portfolios that the 
bulls did. 
110 Fallows (2005), p. 53. 
  36fundamentals and claimed that the trend of rising revenue would continue. In this case it 
was the government, who had preferential access to the necessary information that 




And something similar seems to be happening today with regard to the 
accumulation by the U.S. of external debt. Listen to the administration and this is what 
you hear:  
 
Foreigners have been lending to us and will continue to do so. Simply extrapolate 
the trend in foreign capital inflows and there is no problem with the growing and 
persistent trade deficit. After all, the U.S. is the most attractive place in the world 
in which to invest. In any case, the deficit is the responsibility of our trading 
partners who are saving too much, growing too slowly or manipulating their 
exchange rates. Our budget deficit does not really matter and is not directly 
related to our current account deficit. If our trading partners fix their problems all 
will be well. If they do not they will have to continue to lend to us because the 
cost to them of not doing so is just too high. 
  
The gap between the fundamentals that generally determine how much foreigners 
will be willing to lend to the U.S. and the trend in the accumulation of foreign debt is 
widening. Why? Because new debt is coming on top of trillions of existing debt; the 
returns to American assets have declined relative to returns on the assets of other 
countries; the appetite of private foreign investors for dollar denominated assets has 
sharply declined and been replaced by demand generated by central banks; there are 
limits to how many dollars foreign central banks will be willing to accumulate. The 
financial credibility of the U.S. is being widely called into question. 
 
Without a change in U.S. policy, a global financial tsunami is inevitable. The 
question is not if, but when. To put it bluntly and to change metaphors, by ignoring the 
fundamentals and doing nothing to correct American policy, the U.S. administration is 
playing Russian roulette with the American economy. Correct that, it is playing Russian 
roulette with the world economy. The U.S. may be hard hit by the crisis when it comes 
but so will the rest of the world. And poor countries may be hardest hit of all, as both the 
U.S. and China, the most dynamic sources of external demand for their products, sink 
into recession. Most concerning, is the fact that the administration, driven by its irrational 
exuberance, continues to pull the trigger. By advocating policy changes that actually 
widen the U.S. budget deficit, hence the current account deficit, they are further 
undermining U.S. financial credibility, thereby increasing the probability that the flow of 
foreign capital into the U.S. will diminish, provoking a crisis. 
 
                                                 
111 Once it became clear that revenues would be less than forecast and that the economy was headed into 
recession, the tax cut was rationalized as providing needed economic stimulus.  To reduce a $5.6 trillion 
surplus that would accumulate over a decade it made sense to spread the tax cut over the decade. A tax cut 
spread over a decade did not make sense when what was required was short-term stimulus.   
  37Niall Ferguson, a scholar, at Harvard, of British imperial history has recently 
argued that a large external debt should be viewed as a perk of empire.
112 But the 
historical evidence to which he refers suggests that perk may come at a high price. Prior 
to going heavily into debt to foreigners, Great Britain was a pre-eminent economic, 
diplomatic and military power, and the pound sterling was the world’s leading reserve 
currency. As Ferguson notes, 20 years later the dollar had assumed sterling’s role as a 
reserve currency and Britain’s position in the world was markedly diminished. However, 
few British subjects, then or now, would question the wisdom of the borrowing by 
Churchill’s government. The cause was noble and the stakes incredibly high. The British 
were fighting to prevent their conquest by the Nazis, and then to liberate Europe. 
Churchill did what he had to do. 
 
How will Americans 60 years from now judge the current massive accumulation 
of foreign debt by the U.S.? Seeing that it was largely due to fiscal deficits for which no 
compelling reason could be found, and recognizing that, as a consequence, the dollar had 
been replaced by the euro, the yen and the renminbi as the leading reserve currency, that 
the position of the U.S. in the world was markedly diminished, and that the historic 
opportunity to eliminate mass global poverty had been lost, their judgment is likely to be 
harsh. They are likely to ask, “What was the Bush administration thinking?” 
 
The world economy is balanced on a knife’s edge. If it falls one way the 
tremendous progress the world has made over the past few decades in reducing global 
poverty can be sustained. For hundreds of millions, even billions, of people it means 
replacing illness with good health, it means longer lives and fewer children with more 
and better education and  brighter futures, it means hope rather than despair, an adequate 
supply of the necessities rather than material deprivation. For the first time in human 
history, the end of mass global poverty is not just a pipe dream but a feasible goal. 
 
However, if the world economy falls the other way, what is now a feasible goal 
will, once again, appear to be unachievable.  The number in poverty, and all that implies 
for the sum of human suffering, will increase. The key determinants of which way the 
world economy falls off the knife’s edge are the choices we make in the U.S. The rest of 
the world, and in particular the world’s poor countries, have a big stake in what we 
choose to do. The U.S., as a world leader, has been tested before, and it has risen to the 
challenge. It has the capacity to do so again. 
 
                                                 
112 See Ferguson, NYT, 03/13/05. 
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